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For Michel de Certeau, May 68 represents both a point of crisis and the possibility of a
new beginning. In both of these ways of construing May 68, culture is a central element
in play. We shall see presently that these ideas of have a bearing on how Certeau conceives
of memory both as a social force and as a feature of individual cultural practice. But, to
begin with, we shall consider more closely the form which this new beginning itself might
be said to take.
In the text with which we shall be mainly concerned, La Culture au pluriel, Certeau
presents May 68 as an all-encompassing symbolic revolution: symbolic in the sense that it
calls into question the relationship between a society and its own systemof representation;
and all-encompassing, in that this symbolic crisis affects social relations in their entirety.1
While he concedes in an earlier essay on the same subject that May 68 was symbolic also
in the sense that it signified more than it achieved, the argument that May 68mattered
is a constant feature of Certeau’s account of les événements.2 Although May 68 may be
presented as not having survived the return to order (with the re-election in June of the
government of the right), Certeau insists that a previously tacit system of values is no
more: the ‘revolution’, so to speak, destroys these values, even as it brings them to the
surface.
What Certeau presents as the most original theoretical contribution of these events is
precisely the central place that they give to the symbol.3 The primary place of the symbol
is discourse: ‘la culture aujourd’hui, ça consiste à parler’ [today, culture consists in speaking].
Speech is generally the domain of symbols (a ‘“lieu symbolique”’), but, in the moment of
revolution, its function as such is particularized: it comes to be defined more specifically
as a space according to the gap between ‘les membres d’une société et les modalités de
leur association’ [the members of a society and the modalities of their association].4 This
sudden manifestation of speech as an instrument of disruption is the unmistakable sign
of a cultural crisis: ‘le ressassement de l’anonyme crée l’analogue d’un “bruit” où la parole
a d’abord la forme d’une rupture, d’un trou, d’un blasphème’ (C.p., p. 80) [the recurring
emphasis on anonymity creates the analogy of an ‘interference’ in which speech initially
takes the form of a rupture, a gap, or a blasphemy] (34). Speaking is an action in the
sense that the primary means which ‘fait connaître ce qui se cachait dans l’opacité de la
vie sociale’ (C.p., p. 222) [is able to bring forth what had been hidden in the opacity of
social life] (146).
The search for a new beginning originates, then, in the crisis. Indeed, it is a means by
which the revolutionary impetus is maintained. We can see more clearly how Certeau
theorizes the relationship between culture and society by drawing on a number of es-
sentially programmatic statements contained in the preface to La Culture au pluriel.5
Certeau argues that culture may be defined in a traditional frame of reference according to
a number of determinate reference-points: author, art-work, sphere of artistic production
1. La Culture au pluriel (Paris: Seuil, 1993), p. 141. All future references to this work, first published in
1974, will be given in parentheses in the text (with the abbreviation C.p.). All renderings into English of this
text are taken from the translation published by Tom Conley, Culture in the Plural (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1997), followed by a simple page reference.
2. La Prise de parole (Paris: Seuil 1994), p. 32 (first published in 1968 under the title La Prise de parole:
pour une nouvelle culture).
3. La Prise de parole, pp. 31, 36.
4. La Prise de parole, p. 37.
5. The 1993 edition of this work, edited by Luce Giard, runs together the prefaces from the original edition
of 1974 and the further edition which appeared in Certeau’s lifetime, that of 1980.
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— in brief, what we might term the characteristic features of the system of ‘high’ culture
as a kind of cultural memory. But a fuller understanding of culture as a determinate
kind of travail, a process of working through undertaken within the social space requires
what Certeau terms a disappropriation of culture, a break with proper nouns in favour
of an engagement with culture as a set of signifying practices (C.p., p. 11). Why is this
so? Certeau deprecates the closure of the traditional reference-points and insists that
determinate structures of this sort will always leave an element of indeterminacy: every
place, or lieu, represents a form of differentiation which cannot be dissociated from ‘un
travail de son autre’ (C.p., p. 11) [a labor of its other] (vii). This travail is the means by
which we can identify culture as signifying practice. Culture is thus conditioned by places,
rules, données, and represents the proliferation of inventions (those, say, of everyday life)
in spaces that are socially constrained (C.p., pp. 11, 13).
In sum, his commitment to the reappraisal of the existing symbolic space will lead
Certeau to adopt a quasi-ethnographic, or ‘culturalist’, perspective on culture as a compre-
hensive set of social representations: ‘plutôt qu’un ensemble de “valeurs” à défendre ou
d’idées à promouvoir, la culture connote aujourd’hui un travail à entreprendre sur toute
l’étendue de la vie sociale’ (C.p., p. 166) [today, rather than a sum of ‘values’ that need to
be defended or of ideas to be promoted, culture connotes a labor to be undertaken over
the entire expanse of social life] (102).
Certeau concludes that a crisis of authority emerges where institutions — social and
political, as well as cultural — lose their credibility. This claim explains the urgency with
which he writes: ‘les mois à venir exigeront des choix. […] Cette exigence peut se mesurer
au discrédit qui atteint nos “cadres de référence” officiels et atteste une mutation du
“croyable”’ (C.p., p. 18) [themonths to comewill require hard choices […] This requirement
can be measured by the discredit that infects our official ‘frames of reference’ and that
attests to a mutation of the ‘believable’] (3). A system of authority— at once latent and
changeable— is the condition of any viable form of social organization. The prevailing
set of authorities enables each person to articulate his or her relation both to others and
to truth (C.p., p. 19). A dual relation— to others and to truth— is the basis of Certeau’s
account of authority: thus, ‘une vérité sans société n’est qu’un leurre. Une société sans
vérité n’est qu’une tyrannie’ (C.p., p. 30) [a truth without a society is merely a lure. A
society without a truth is merely a tyranny] (14). Culture is part of this system: it can
be regarded as a ‘langage social’ and, as we have seen, a cultural crisis (or schisme) comes
about where there is a dissociation ‘entre un langage social et ceux qui renoncent à le
parler’ (C.p., p. 23) [between a social language and those who refuse to speak it] (8). In a
time of crisis, culture may be thought of as a social space of signification according to the
possibilities for action that it contains, some of which may appear violent and may have a
salutary impact on an existing tacit system of values. A ‘violent’ act of refusal is magnified
precisely because of its singularity: it is an act which ‘traverse d’une protestation un
univers saturé’ (C.p., p. 80) [cries out in protest against a saturated universe] (34). The
act of ‘making’ truth represents, then, a tentative form of agency: it corresponds to the
attempt to discover ‘les voies de la lucidité et de l’action’ (C.p., p. 19) [the issues of lucidity
and action] (4).6 Symbolic violence is important it that it signals a necessary change. But
Certeau insists that an act of this sort remains only a protest, unless it is assumed into a
political project. A political project is the context in which this violence can be oriented as
a ‘travail’ that defines its objectives according to the existing state of forces within society
(C.p., pp. 81–82).
6. Following Husserl, Certeau goes on to argue — more strongly — that action consists in the attempt
to ‘fonder une société sur des raisons de vivre propres à tous et à chacun’ (C.p., p. 31) [[base] a society on
reasons for living that belong both to all and to each] (14). He cites Paul Ricœur’s translation of La Crise de
l’humanité européenne et la philosophie (Paris: Aubier-Montaigne, 1977), which contains elements of Husserl’s
late unfinished work of the mid-1930s, Die Krisis der europäische Wissenschaften und die transzendentale
Phänomenologie. Eine Einteilung in die phänomenologische Philosophie.
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Now, if canonical reference-points are in doubt, memory is inevitably affected. Any
attempt to preserve the values and institutions of the past runs the risk of sacrificing the
commitment to truth — where these values and institutions have become diminished
memories of the past— to their residual utility asmeans of keeping a social system in place
(C.p., p. 20). A further indication of the denial of a crisis is the ritualized perpetuation
of memory: ‘nous avons trop d’anniversaires et pas assez de présent. Le pays fête des
grandeurs et des célébrités qui étaient, hier, des signes de ralliement, mais qui ne le sont
plus’ (C.p., p. 22) [we have too many commemorations and not enough of the present.
The country celebrates the grandeur and the celebrities that used to be rallying points,
but that are no more] (7).7 The dynamics of memory will have some bearing also on
how new forms of cultural activity come to emerge and be recognized. Firstly, memory
can be closely linked to agency. Thus, the multiple manières de faire, or creative ruses
practiced by individuals within the vast social space, are of decisive cultural significance,
and occupy a particular place within any system ofmemory: they are presented by Certeau
as passing manifestations of an enduring ‘mémoire sans langage’ [a memory without
language].8 Secondly, the observer can at best apprehend the innumerable mobile sets
of tactics that exist in the present only by means of a kind of investigative fiction: the
framework in which a given research mission is carried out is the effect of an imaginary
projection (for it is impossible to grasp the social space in its entirety), within which any
written analytical record captures only fragments of the phenomena under observation.
Recorded memories, in any form, are no more than the manifestation of difference: ‘de ce
que chacun fait, qu’est-ce qui s’écrit? Entre les deux, l’image, fantôme du corps expert et
muet, préserve la différence’ [of all the things that everyone does, how much gets written
down? Between the two, the image, the phantom of the expert but mute body, preserves
the difference].9 What matters most, then, is the constant negotiation of our access
to culture, the endless process of working through culture that is a constant feature of
everyday life; not, in other words, the forms in which culture may happen to be preserved,
recorded or transmitted.10 Memory, as a social force, becomes open to contestation, yet,
considered as an element of individual cultural practice, it emerges as a space in which
both traces of past events and possibilities of future action may be discerned.
‘Popular culture’
Preservation, recording and transmission are central features of any attempt to describe
or to recover popular culture, and the longest chapter in La Culture au pluriel is devoted to
an operation of this sort. Written in common with Dominique Julia and Jacques Revel, it
7. See Marc Augé, who extends this line of argument to the accumulation of artefacts of memory, stating
that the contemporary interest in former ways of life derives from the sense that they convey something of a
past that is in fact lost, in Non-lieux: introduction à une anthropologie de la surmodernité (Paris: Seuil, 1992),
p. 37.
8. See L’Invention du quotidien, i, Arts de faire, second edition (Paris: Gallimard, 1990), p. 65 (English
version: The Practice of Everyday Life, tr. by Steven F. Randall (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984),
p. 40). Compare the ‘mémoire silencieuse et repliée’ [silent and withdrawn memory] of the walkers, the
Wandersmänner, in the city (i, 158; English version, p. 105).
9. See L’Invention du quotidien, i, 67–68 (English version: The Practice of Everyday Life, p. 42). Certeau
draws an important and influential distinction between strategy and tactics, the former being based on the
appraisal from a position of relative autonomy of the balance of forces, the latter being a feature of day-to-day
social practice, based on the fortuitous exploitation of ephemeral opportunities within a space which remains
that of the other (see L’Invention du quotidien, i, xlvi–xlvii, and also ‘Qu’est-ce qu’un séminaire?’, Esprit, n.s.
11–12 (1978), 176–81 (pp. 179–80)). On the acute problem of how to capture and understand the actions of
the individual agent (and, in particular, the difficulty of maintaining a distinction between the actions of a
number of agents and the composite behaviours ascribable to the average), see Augé, Non-lieux, pp. 52–53.
10. On this distinction, and on resourcefulness and creativity as features of our access to common life,
see Michael Sheringham, ‘Attending to the everyday: Blanchot, Lefebvre, Certeau, Perec’, French Studies, 54
(2000), 187–99 (pp. 191–92).
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was first published in 1970.11 The essay is in some part polemical: thus, Certeau, Julia
and Revel state in an initial note that what they have in view is the concept of popular
culture (C.p., p. 45). Their critique is framed accordingly: ‘ce qui est donc en cause, ce ne
sont pas des idéologies, ni des options, mais les relations qu’un objet et des méthodes
scientifiques entretiennent avec la société qui les permet’ (C.p., p. 47) [the question,
then, is not one of ideologies, or of options, but that of the relations of an object and its
associated scientific methods to the society that sanctions them] (H., p. 121). Certeau
himself does not explicitly establish a relationship between the notion of a symbolic
revolution (the act, as we have seen, of bringing what remains unthought — the impensé
— to the surface) and the act of stating what is at stake in establishing ‘popular culture’ as
an object; but a relationship along these lines can clearly be established. For, as he and his
co-authors argue at the outset, what the establishment of ‘popular culture’ as an object
involves is a tacit act of censure: ‘la “culture populaire” suppose une opération qui ne
s’avoue pas. Il a fallu qu’elle fût censurée pour être étudiée’ (C.p., p. 45) [‘popular culture’
presupposes an unavowed operation. Before being studied, it had to be censored] (H.,
p. 119). Popular culture illustrates a disruption of memory that is the effect of relations
of power.
There are four main points that I wish to highlight: the identity of patrimoine as a kind
of memory; the interaction of memory and forgetting; self-contradiction as a feature of
the description of ‘popular’ culture, and its converse, namely the avowal of interest as an
act of memory; and the bracketing of memory in the recovery of popular culture (or of
the past, more generally).12
First, it is clear, in this context, that any claim of a scientific folklore to recover a
cultural patrimoine will be controversial. Certeau, Julia and Revel also describe the impor-
tant folklore movement of the mid-nineteenth century and beyond. The souci folkloriste
represents an attempt to record and to preserve what is under threat frommodernization:
‘il veut situer, rattacher, garantir’ [its intent was to situate, reconnect, guarantee]. Thus,
for Certeau, Julia and Revel, it is inescapably subject to a wider social set of interests:
‘son intérêt est comme l’envers d’une censure: une intégration raisonnée’ (C.p., p. 53)
[what it was interested in was almost the opposite of censorship: reasoned integration]
(H., p. 124). Because it is extensible into the present (and can thus represent a fabricated
sort of memory), a patrimoinemay amount in the end to a sanitized version of a distinc-
tively national repertoire, defined historically (according to the establishment of a set of
popular themes which contribute to the fabrication of a community within history) and
geographically (the cohesion of a given physical space is attested by the dissemination of
popular culture) (C.p., p. 53). It may amount, in other words, to a kind ofmentalité.13
Second, the domain of popular culture is of interest to Certeau, Julia and Revel in
part because it is inescapably subject to forgetting. In dealing with a number of works
11. Julia and Revel also collaborated with Certeau on a further book: Une politique de la langue: la Révolution
française et les patois (Paris: Gallimard, 1975). Conley’s translation excludes this chapter, which is here quoted
according to the translation by Brian Massumi published in Heterologies: Discourse on the Other, ed. by Wlad
Godzich (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986), pp. 119–36, abbreviated as H.
12. It is worth noting that these points all converge also on the problem of the relationship between a
branch of knowledge and the pouvoir that brings it into being, a topic that connects this essay to Certeau’s
own other works on historical method and epistemology. Thus, the critique feeds into the attempt by Certeau,
Julia and Revel to characterize history as the discourse whose purpose is to reveal how an act of violence may
effectively be at the base of any act of recovery or of memory: ‘l’histoire est en cela, même si elle n’est que cela,
le lieu privilégié où le regard s’inquiète’ (C.p., p. 71) [history is the privileged place where the gaze becomes
unsettled, even if it is only that] (H., p. 136). See also L’Écriture de l’histoire (Paris: Gallimard, 1975), in
particular chs 1 and 2. For the historian, the forgotten is a remainder which can be used to disrupt prevailing
representations of the past (see L’Écriture de l’histoire, pp. 80–81 and 91–92).
13. See G. E. R. Lloyd, who comments extensively on the tendency of mentalities to confer a false
impression of coherence with regard to systems of belief and modes of reasoning that coexist within a given
culture, community or individual, in Demystifying Mentalities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1990).
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published in France during the 1960s devoted to aspects of historical popular culture of
the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, they conclude that any work of erudition
will inevitably contain substantial omissions (the examples of childhood, sexuality and
violence are cited).14 In other words, the areas of life over which these works pass in
silence represent a ‘géographie de l’oublié’ (C.p., p. 63) [a geography of the forgotten] (H.,
p. 131), a ghostly residue of the culture which historical work can never fully recover. The
knowledge and assumptions of the historian are distinct from the object on which he or
she works. Thus, the historian cannot receive the popular in itself — or least, he/she
must guard against concluding that popular culture manifests itself other than in a form
that allows it to circulate on the margins of a social system which is primarily organized
according to the demands of elite culture. Accordingly, ‘la culture populaire ne se saisit
que sur le mode de la disparition parce que notre savoir nous impose […] de ne plus
l’entendre et de ne plus savoir en parler’ (C.p., p. 63) [popular culture can only be grasped
in the process of vanishing because […] our knowledge requires us to cease hearing it, to
no longer know how to discuss it] (H., p. 131). The presence of the observer effectively
annihilates what is under observation, leading to the abstraction of determinate cultural
practices from the historical circumstances of the agents who performed them.
Third, Certeau, Julia and Revel go on to argue that scholarly descriptions of popular
culture will tend to lapse into self-contradiction. These contradictions illustrate the
tendency of the folklorist or the historian to occult, or to forget, their complicity with
the drive to control or to eliminate popular culture. The search for the origins of popular
culture exposes the methods of folklore or cultural history to this risk, if we allow the
claim that folklore comes into being only because its objects are threatened by extinction.
Thus, more recent studies of popular culture, which work within the framework provided
by the cultural movement of the nineteenth century, are prone to circular arguments:
they ‘se donnent pour objet leur propre origine’ [take as their object their own origin];
they ‘poursuivent à la surface des textes […] ce qui est en réalité leur propre condition
de possibilité: l’élimination d’une menace populaire’ (C.p., p. 59) [they pursue across the
surface of texts […] what is actually their own condition of possibility — the elimination
of a popular menace] (H., p. 128). The same problem affects the explanation of the social
functions of popular culture: ‘est “populaire” ce qui reflète immédiatement la situation
historique du peuple sous l’Ancien Régime’ (C.p., p. 62) [anything that directly ‘reflects’
the historical situation of the people under the ancien régime is ‘popular’] (H., p. 130). In
other words, the supposition of an origin within popular culture is taken to validate the
descriptions of specific practices which are themselves taken to be popular: ‘la culture
populaire est supposée là à tous les instants de la démarche qu’elle vient cautionner’ (C.p.,
p. 62) [the presence, out there, of popular culture is presupposed at each stage of the
process for which it stands as guarantor] (H., p. 130).
Fourth, Certeau, Julia and Revel repeatedly argue that the description of popular
culture is inevitably bound up with the act of ‘violence’, the annihilation of precisely this
culture, that brings such an enquiry about: this is what is ‘“oublié” ou dénié’ (C.p., p. 59)
[‘forgotten’ or denied] (H., p. 128). In fact, what must be kept in the memory is the act of
violence, not the culture which it claims as its object, which remain unrecoverable: ‘on
ne saurait […] reprocher à une littérature de s’articuler sur une violence (puisque c’est
toujours le cas), mais de ne pas l’avouer’ (C.p., p. 68) [we cannot reproach a literature for
grafting itself upon a prior violence (for that is always the case); but we can reproach
it for not admitting it] (H., p. 134). Thus, how culture is documented and interpreted
is a question of current political as well as intellectual interest. The case of ‘popular’
culture suggests that a claim to continuity with the past may be forged paradoxically by
exclusion of the past and, further, that the problem of forgetting extends to the discourse
14. The main contemporary works in question are: Robert Mandrou, De la culture populaire en France aux
XVIIe et XVIIIe siècles (Paris: Stock, 1964); Geneviève Bollème, Les Almanachs populaires aux XVIIe et XVIIIe
siècles (The Hague: Mouton, 1969); Marc Soriano, Les Contes de Perrault (Paris: Gallimard, 1968).
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of knowledge that makes this outcome possible.15 What is at stake in the process is the
perpetuation of cultural memory; but the process itself reveals how the elaboration of
any such memory can itself be the effect of powerful forms of forgetting.
Memory and creativity
Popular culture can be taken to illustrate a feature of culture generally, namely the mani-
festation of remainders. Certeau writes, for instance, that ‘la gestion d’une société laisse
un énorme “reste”’ [the management of a society leaves in its midst an enormous ‘re-
mainder’], and he goes on precisely to identify the remainder with the notion of culture:
‘Sur nos cartes, ça s’appelle culture, flux et reflux de rumeurs sur les plages avancées de la
planification’ (C.p., p. 206) [on our maps, that is what is called culture. It is the ebb and
flow of muffled voices on the architects’ blueprints in their advanced stages of drafting]
(134). Popular culture is — at best — the remainder of an act of recovery that proceeds
from within elite culture and that may well be blind to the circularity of its procedures.
It is this concern with what lies beyond any or all grids, maps, schemas, that informs
Certeau’s account of creativity, within which he sketches an account of memory relative
to the dynamics of time and of action, which we shall now go on to consider.
The loss of tradition as a local binding force accentuates the proliferation of heteroge-
neous signifying practices. At the same time, the social space comes to be more and more
minutely mapped, such that there exists no space external to it: ‘il n’y a plus d’ailleurs’
[there is no longer an elsewhere].16 What risks being lost, or forgotten, is the sense that
signifying practices allow the individual to situate him or herself with reference to a stable
local frame of reference. The conviction that the social space is heavily constrained leads
Certeau to theorize memory with reference to time. Thus, memory is defined as ‘une
présence à la pluralité des temps et [qui] ne se limite donc pas au passé’ [designates a
presence to the plurality of times and is thus not limited to the past].17 Memory becomes
available as a sudden recapitulation which coincides, if only for a moment, with the in-
finity of lived experience. In mediating the invisible resources of time, memory allows
us to transgress for a moment ‘la loi du lieu’ [the law of the place].18 This memory, in
substituting for tradition, operates in a place which is not proper to it, and which it does
not seek to possess. It is above all an unpredictable means of responding to the state of
things at any given moment.
The predicament of the individual cultural agent flows in part from the existence
of powerful agencies (for instance, the system of education, bureaucracies, the media)
which fundamentally influence and constrain our cultural activity (even though these
entities themselves will become exposed to crises of credibility and of authority if they
no longer benefit from the adhésion of individual subjects) (C.p., pp. 23, 29). Certeau also
claims that culture must be understood within the framework of an anthropology of what
is taken to be believable (une anthropologie de la crédibilité), that is, the context within
which beliefs assume a social significance, and, further, that cultural practices cannot
be dissociated from a tactical science bearing on the innumerable range of individual,
everyday manières de faire (C.p., p. 12). What Certeau terms creativity thus presupposes a
break with ‘la culture au singulier’: ‘la culture au singulier est devenue une mystification
politique. Bien plus, elle est mortifère’ (C.p., p. 122) [culture in the singular has become a
political mystification. Furthermore, it is deadly] (67). Culture in the singular represents
a denial of creativity. By contrast, culture as creative work tends to oscillate between what
Certeau terms two ‘forme’: ‘d’un côté, elle est ce qui “permane”; de l’autre, ce qui s’invente’
15. As Jeremy Ahearne comments, what is at issue is a strategic operation, one ‘which substitutes for the
effective practices of the vast majority of the population a stable set of representations’, inMichel de Certeau:
Interpretation and its Other (Cambridge: Polity, 1995), p. 136.
16. See again L’Invention du quotidien, i, 65–66 (English version: The Practice of Everyday Life, p. 40).
17. L’Invention du quotidien, i, 320, n. 7 (The Practice of Everyday Life, p. 218, n. 7).
18. L’Invention du quotidien, i, 129 (The Practice of Everyday Life, p. 85).
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(C.p., p. 211) [on the one side is what ‘permanates’; on the other, what is invented] (137).
The interplay of these forces is a matter of the social conjoncture. At a given moment,
the pull of each forces is such that it leads us to forget the existence of the other — and
further, past and future alike are contained in this cultural oscillation, themselves like
half-forgotten rituals, or emergent manifestations that will themselves become the object
of the characteristically fraught work which is that of memory.
Against the background of this theorization of cultural plurality, it is forgetting, rather
than memory, that may serve as a sign of incipient cultural activity. The manifestation of
culture produces a momentary break in the prevailing system of culture. Culture is a kind
of variant that introduces a disturbance, an element of play, into a system. It manifests
itself a ‘un oubli fugitif à l’intérieur des grandes orthodoxies de la mémoire’ (C.p., p. 216)
[a fugacious oblivion within the great orthodoxies of memory] (141). Certeau mentions
forgetting only in passing, as one of the forms which cultural variation might take. But
the essential point is that fleeting forgetfulness is one means by which we can detect
the tremor of culture as something unpredictable, disruptive, ephemeral. And forgetting
remains part of the process, in that these cultural acts are not recuperated so as to become
part of a regulated collective memory: ‘la création est périssable. Elle passe, car elle est
acte’ (C.p., p. 214) [creation is perishable: it passes because it is an act] (140).19 Under
conditions of cultural heteronomy, there may be no activity without forgetting: the oubli
is only fleeting, but as such is the royal road not simply to provisionality, but to risk.
The space of creativity owes its existence to the agent’s self-abstraction from memory
as a form of social constraint. It is this exclusion of memory that is the means by which
Certeau seeks to identify the secret rationale of the innovations of the individual agent:
‘l’analyse et la pratique de l’innovation dans nos espaces construits ne touchent pas à
l’essentiel, qui est aussi le plus fragile: un désir de vivre en perdant les assurances que
multiplie chaque société — une folie d’être’ (C.p., p. 222) [the analysis and practice of
innovation in our constructed spaces do not touch on the essential point, which is also
the most fragile: a desire to live while losing the assurances that every society multiplies
— a madness of being] (147).20
If memory and forgetting are significant in Certeau’s work, it is in part because they
point to the ambiguity of what is common. Memory is inescapably subject to social
pressures that have a bearing both on the control ofmeaning (for instance, thosemeanings
ascribed to the past) and on the regulation of social ‘spaces’ (as one process among many
in the naturalization of a given set of social relations). Forgetting is no less complex a
phenomenon: it deprives memory of its lustre, but can also signify an unacknowledged
complicity in processes of fabrication and repression. It is within common life that
tensions of this sort are played out: both memory and forgetting can be a sign of the
stultifying power of the culture of the singular, or of the emergence of plurality. Tracking
memory and forgetting alike enables us to glimpse something of the ambiguity of Certeau’s
theorization of culture — as a place of agency and creativity, on the one hand, and of
contestation and conflict, on the other.
19. Cf. L’Invention du quotidien, i, 286–87, on recognition, as distinct from appropriation, as the character-
istic mode of a desiring engagement with the périssable as a manifestation of otherness.
20. See Edgar Morin, who comments on the intensity of Certeau’s focus on the existential dimension of
culture, within which the activity of the agent comes to be grasped as ‘la façon dont est vécu un problème
global’ [the way in which some all-encompassing problem is lived], in Sociologie, second edition (Paris: Fayard,
1994), p. 158.
